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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper has two objectives. First, it identifies investment criteria used by Pakistani 
venture capitalists (VCs) in the investment evaluation process. Second, it analyses how 
Pakistan VCs decision policies differ from their US and Indian counterparts. It is found 
that among Pakistani VCs, the factors related to the entrepreneur and management team 
are considered predominant and decisive in making investment decisions. Pakistani VCs 
rely heavily on a relationship-based approach in decision policies and may gradually 
move to a market-based approach once the economy's formal institutions attain stability. 
A relationship-based approach focusing on social networks can help substitute for formal 
institutions such as law, regulation and enforcement, which would facilitate the process 
of financial and non-financial transactions in the operation of venture capital markets in 
emerging economies. The differences I observed among US, Indian and Pakistani VCs 
decision policies regarding the use of investment evaluation criteria reflect the 
differences in institutional contexts. Moreover, I draw on agency theory to further view 
my survey results regarding the venture capital market in Pakistan. The results are in line 
with agency theory prescriptions that a relationship-based approach may be better suited 
to mitigate the agency problem, particularly adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, by implementing the four prescriptions proposed by Ian and Peter (1994).   
 
Keywords: venture capital, investment criteria, emerging economies, relationship-based 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The venture capital market (VCM) plays an important role in technological and 
economic growth through its direct involvement in the development of a wide 
variety of enterprises (Maier & Walker, 1987). Specifically, it has been posited as 
potentially providing an impetus to economic growth for developing countries 
(Aylward, 1998). For emerging economies such as Pakistan that that are in the 
process of moving from traditional labour-intensive methods of production 
towards knowledge-based ones, the use of venture capital becomes more 
important than ever. Pakistan is at a threshold of achieving the status of a middle-
income country,  and  an  important  factor  stimulating  structural  change from a 
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low- to middle-income economy appears to be the growth in the size and scale of 
SMEs (Faisal, Ali & Ehsan-ul-Haque, 2005). The existence of an active VCM 
may further expedite this process of structural change, leading to a high-income 
economy, as studies find that there exists a positive relation between institutional 
investments, the size of the firm and the presence of venture capital funding 
(Mishra, 2004). The creation of an effective VCM in emerging economies 
requires a thorough understanding of how the VCM functions in each emerging 
economy. This paper, a step in this direction, focuses on the VCM in Pakistan, a 
major emerging economy in South Asia. The first objective of this paper is to 
identify investment criteria used by Pakistani VCs in an investment evaluation 
process. Although some studies classify the VCM as homogeneous (Fried & 
Hisrich, 1988), most research has found it to be heterogeneous (Bygrave & 
Timmons, 1992; Elango, Fried, Hisrich & Polenchek, 1995). The heterogeneity 
of venture capital markets, in part, depends on the stability level of the economic 
institutions in which they operate. In developed countries, such as the US, 
institutions are stable and are characterised by the rule of law, transparency, 
accountability, an efficient judicial system and an effective contractual 
enforcement mechanism. In contrast, in emerging economies such as Pakistan 
and India, institutions tend to be weak with overall poor and ineffective corporate 
governance and control. This poor legal and institutional framework in emerging 
economies affects the dissemination of information about market conditions and 
participants, thereby creating an agency problem (For more discussion, see 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Consequently, the different levels of institutional 
stability across countries lead VCs to construct decision policies in significantly 
different ways to cope with market failures caused by weak institutions. The 
differences that exist in the way in which VCs make decision policies across 
countries have been examined in various studies (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; 
Elango et al., 1995; Sapienza & Timmons, 1989). In an attempt to contribute to 
the knowledge about such differences, the second objective of this paper is to 
compare the survey results of Pakistani VCs with those of the US and Indian 
studies in order to examine the differences in investment decision policies. For a 
comparison of results, the US is selected because it is the most developed VCM, 
the US venture capital model serves as a benchmark with which other VCMs can 
be compared (Andrew et al., 2007), and India is selected because it shares a 
relatively similar cultural and legal system with Pakistan among South Asian 
countries. Therefore, this comparison may further our understanding of how VCs 
make investment decision policies in closely related emerging economies.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. First, I give a brief overview of the VCMs in 
Asia and Pakistan. Second, section describes the methodology used in this study 
and discuses the investment criteria used by Pakistani VCs. This is followed by 
the identification of the differences and similarities in investment decisions 
among US, Pakistani and Indian VCs. The third section takes on an agency 
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theory perspective to further view the results obtained in previous sections. 
Finally, the fourth section concludes and presents the implications of this study. 
 
Venture Capital in Asia 
 
The Asian venture capital pool has increased from USD33,433 million in 1995 to 
USD106,383 millions in 2004, implying an annual growth rate of 13.7%. 
Similarly, the Asian venture capital investment portfolio increased from 
USD17,751 million in 1995 to USD75,434 million in 2004, showing an annual 
growth rate of 17.4%. In 2005 and 2006, the world's leading buyout and venture 
firms poured into Asia to open offices, hire staff, and launch Asian-related 
regional funds. This brought a sense of optimism among the Asian venture 
community, which will certainly translate into better performance figures in the 
future. Some Asian countries have apparently benefited from the technology and 
economic fronts from the existence of viable venture capital industries in their 
respective countries. In the early 1970s, Japan witnessed the emergence of a 
technological environment and a culture of risk-taking entrepreneurs creating 
new business ventures. During the same period, the dynamic performance of 
some business ventures has been boosted by the rapid development of the venture 
capital industry in Japan (Dennis & Turpin, 1993). In Singapore, the report of the 
Subcommittee on Entrepreneurial Development clearly assigned a central role to 
venture capital in the entrepreneurial development process and in Singapore's 
economic future; here, venture capital is seen as the bridge between the 
technologies of the United States and Europe and the transfer of technology to 
Singapore (Dennis, 1991). The experience of Taiwan shows that technological 
innovation and the growth of venture capital markets are closely interrelated 
(Premus, 1985). In Korea, the government has been supporting venture capital 
firms since the 1980s as part of its programme to develop high-technology 
industries (Joondoug et al., 1994). 
 
Venture Capital in Pakistan 
 
Venture capital companies and venture capital funds are of recent origin in 
Pakistan, as their history dates back only to the early 1990s. The legal framework 
for the establishment of venture capital companies was set up for the first time by 
the Pakistani government in February 1995. This legal framework was revised in 
July 2000 and was made more lenient and conducive to helping venture capital 
activities flourish. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan under 
venture capital companies and funds rule defines venture capital as a "company 
that is engaged in financing any venture project through equity or other 
investments, whether convertible into equity or not, and provides managerial or 
technical expertise to venture projects or acts as a management company for 
management of venture capital funds." 
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The Pakistani venture capital market witnessed slower-than-expected growth 
during the 1990s. The government analysts attribute this slower expansion of 
venture capital to the overall slower economic growth during the 1990s and the 
lack of qualified professional venture capitalists knowledgeable about the 
operation of venture capital in emerging economies. It is further argued that the 
key hurdle to expanding Pakistan's venture capital business has been 
entrepreneurs' attitude, which is also expected to be a challenge in the future. 
That is, entrepreneurs are less motivated to raise venture capital because of their 
family-owned and cultural values that discourage an entrepreneur to share the 
part of ownership and control with outsider (e.g., venture capitalists) in return for 
money. Second, the business culture of Pakistan is not appreciative of the riskier 
efforts of an entrepreneur. If an entrepreneurial effort fails, it is very probable that 
the entrepreneur will lose his name and fame along with his money. Failure is an 
unshakable stigma. In contrast, in the US, to have failed is not an ineradicable 
black mark against an entrepreneur (Keith, 1991). Such failure in certain cases is 
treated as a positive factor towards economic development. As noted by Robert 
D. Hormats, Vice-Chairman of Goldman Sachs International, "an entrepreneur 
who has gone bankrupt with one idea can come back and get the venture 
capitalist to start another idea. In a period of low savings rates, high government 
spending and other economic problems, this stands out as big advantage" (Keith, 
1991, p. 105). Therefore, there appears to be a need for an attitudinal shift 
towards the acceptance of a risk-oriented equity culture in our society at large. 
Presently, venture capital companies are mainly focused in the media and 
telecom sector and also prefer to invest in business process outsourcing (BPO). 
The Pakistan Economic Survey (2005) notes that "Venture Capital Companies 
and other Financial Institutions (FIs) fulfil only 18 to 21% of fund requirements 
of the domestic software houses. There is an emerging need for the venture 
capital companies to concentrate on this sector, especially in aiding the local 
companies in product development and marketing the IT-enabled services of 
local companies abroad to get any sizeable share in the global BPO market." 
Moreover, In Pakistan, the stringent collateral requirements of banks and other 
FIs limit new start-ups' as well as existing SMEs' access to financing. FIs require 
collateral of up to 120%–130% of the loan value (Khan, 1997). This is why 
SMEs mostly rely on self-financing or retained earnings (Pakistani Economic 
Survey, 2005). Consequently, a financing gap occurs when capital sources such 
as self-raised or retained earnings are exhausted. Venture capital companies could 
be one of the ways to bridge this financing gap in a commercial capacity. The 
government of Pakistan, as part of its programme to promote the venture capital 
industry, granted a tax exemption for venture capital investment for a period of 
seven years from 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2007. The further extension of the 
period of this tax exemption is presently on the cards with government policy 
makers. Venture capital activities in Pakistan have been spurred in recent years. 
The total assets of venture capital companies witnessed the highest one-time 
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annual growth of 218% from Pakistan Rupees (PRs) 1005 million in FY 2004 to 
PRs3,200 million in FY 2005 (Figure 1).  
 
Table 1 
Profile of respondent venture capital companies (VCCs) 
 
Profile Mean Max. Min. 
The size of venture capital firms' assets  
(USD millions) 
32 60 4 
The average size of investment (USD millions) 5.2 10 0.20 
The annual number of applications for venture 
capital received by VCCs 
250 1000 50 
The annual percent of applications (out of total) 
funded by VCCs 
1.6% 2.0% 0.9% 
Percent of investment in small businesses 90% 100% 80% 
The annual expected return in percent that VCCs 
require for their investment 
28% 30% 25% 
The percentage of working hours in a year that VCs 
devote to monitoring portfolio companies 
68% 75% 60% 
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Figure 1. The pool of venture capital companies' assets in Pakistan. (Pakistan 
Rupees in millions) 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (various issues). 
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INVESTMENT CRITERIA OF PAKISTAN VENTURE CAPITALISTS  
 
Literature Review 
 
There is a large body of empirical research conducted in both developed and 
developing countries that has focused on identifying and weighing the relative 
investment evaluation criteria that venture capitalists use to evaluate potential 
investments. Related studies in this context are conducted in the US (MacMillan, 
Robin & Narasimha, 1985; John & Charles, 1993; Tyebjee & Burno, 1984), 
Canada (Russell, 1988), Europe (Russell, 1994), the United Kingdom (Dixon, 
1991; Grahame & Margaret, 1997), and Asia (Dennis & Turpin [Japan], 1993; 
Dennis [Singapore], 1991; Pandey & Angela [Taiwan], (1996); Joondoug, Jung 
& Lee [Korea], 1994; Pandey [India], 1995; Mishra [India], 2004).  
 
The understanding of evaluation criteria and the weights attached to them by VCs 
are of great importance for many reasons. First, VCs are widely considered to be 
particularly successful in selecting and funding innovative and new growth 
ventures (Burno & Tyebjee, 1983; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; Vesa  & 
Christian, 2005). Consequently, the success rate of venture capital-backed 
ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of non-venture capital-
backed ventures (Davis & Stetson, 1984; Dorsey, 1979; Kunkel & Hofer, 1991; 
Sandberg, 1986; Timmons, 1994). The survival rate for venture capital-backed 
ventures ranges from around 65% (Sahlman, 1990) to 85% of the VCs portfolio 
(Dorsey, 1979). Second, the lack of collateral and significant information 
asymmetries limit the ability of entrepreneurs to get financing from traditional 
lending institutions such as Banks. Venture capital companies, being a 
specialized financial intermediary, generally have the necessary expertize and 
skills to reduce this asymmetric information risk at the pre-investment stage by 
applying selective evaluation criteria.  
 
Methodology 
 
In order to prepare the relevant list of evaluation criteria that are expected to be 
used by VCs in Pakistan, I have first taken 27 well-known criteria found in the 
US by MacMillan et al. (1985). In a venture investment evaluation, VCs in 
emerging economies face some typical problems that VCs in developed countries 
may not encounter. For this reason, after reviewing the existing studies on 
evaluation criteria in the US and Asian growing-developing economies and in 
consultation with a venture capitalist working in Pakistan, the author has 
identified and assembled a list of 44-criteria. The criteria are classified into seven 
major categories:  
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(i) The entrepreneur's personality  
(ii) The entrepreneur's experience  
(iii) Product/service characteristics  
(iv) Market characteristics  
(v) Financial characteristics  
(vi) Environment conditions  
(vii) Venture team composition  
 
In addition, at the end of each category, the 'others' column was added for write-
in respondents.  
 
The survey questionnaire was used to collect information. The respondents were 
asked to weigh the importance that they attach to each criterion using the 
following four-point scale. 
 
1.  Irrelevant—Not a factor in the decision-making process.  
2.  Desirable—A factor that improves the likelihood of investment.  
3.  Important—A factor that must be present in order for an investment to 
take place, unless other factors specifically compensate for this factor's 
absence.  
4.  Essential—A factor that must be present under any circumstance in order 
for an investment to take place. 
 
This four-point scale is similar to that used in US and Indian research studies by 
MacMillan et al. (1985) and Pandey (1995), respectively, to which the results of 
this study were compared. A total of six questionnaires were mailed directly to 
the CEO of each venture capital company 1 and fund in Pakistan listed in the 
Venture Capital Directory published in the Asian Venture Capital Journal (2005), 
and five responses were received, for a response rate of 83%, indicating a high 
level of interest. For some academic researchers, the sample seems too small to 
justify empirical analysis. Here are some reasons to mitigate the objections of our 
having a small sample. First, to my knowledge, this is the first study of its nature 
in Pakistan and is aimed to enhance the understanding of Pakistan's emerging 
VCM. Second, the sample is small in number but fully represents Pakistan's 
VCM. Third, other related research studies in contexts where the results are based 
on five observations are done by Dennis (1991) in Singapore and Scheela and 
Dinh (2004) in Vietnam. This study has all of the weaknesses of self-report 
study, so the results must be considered with some caution. 
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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
Entrepreneur Personality and Experience 
 
Apparently, the quality of the entrepreneur and its management team serve the 
most important and decisive factors in making investment decision in Pakistan.  
Six of the top ten most important criteria are related to the entrepreneur's 
personality and experience [Table 2(a)]. Specifically, integrity, commitment and 
enthusiasm and the capability of sustained intense effort are perceived by 
Pakistani VCs as highly valuable characteristics of an entrepreneur. 
Consequently, Pakistani VCs in their 78% deals get into contact with 
entrepreneur's former business associates to check his integrity and commitment 
(Appendix B). The managerial capability of an entrepreneur is ranked as the 
second most important factor when it comes to determining the quality of an 
entrepreneur. It implies that entrepreneurs should have necessary expertize and 
skills such as managing people, directing business operations and using resources 
judiciously to run a business. Of least concern for Pakistani VCs is a compatible 
personality, the ability to be articulate in discussing venture and educational 
background.  
 
Product/Service and Market Characteristics  
 
The most important product characteristic seems to be competitive advantage, 
which all the respondents unanimously consider to be a 'must-have' element. This 
implies that for the safety of the investment and for insulation against competitive 
attack, Pakistani VCs prefer to have a sustainable competitive advantage in the 
form of a functioning prototype or proprietary protection. A firm is said to have a 
sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing a value-creating 
strategy that is not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this 
strategy (Barney, 1991). The source of competitive advantage can be financial, 
physical, human, organizational, informational or relational. Furthermore, the 
ease of technical manpower procurement and raw material availability factors do 
not seem to be the part of investment evaluation process by US VCs but are 
considered important by Pakistani VCs, as the mean values of both factors are           
3 and 3.2, respectively, on a four-point scale. It seems that such factors are 
especially challenging and problematic in developing countries and thus need to 
be considered. This finding is in line with other research studies carried out in 
developing nations (Joondoug et al., 1994; Pandey & Angela, 1996). 
Surprisingly, the need for a product to be high-tech is regarded as irrelevant by 
Pakistani VCs, given that venture capital is usually discussed as a high-
technology-oriented industry (Florida & Kenny, 1988). Location within a large 
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market with high growth potential is the most critical market requirement for 
Pakistani VCs in investment evaluation process. 
 
Financial Characteristics and Environment Conditions 
 
In terms of financial characteristics, the prime concern for Pakistani VCs is the 
safety and liquidity of their investment. The mean of average annual expected 
returns required by Pakistani VCs is 28%, ranging from 25% to 30%. This is to 
compare with the 25% to 40% expected returns demanded in India (Mishra, 
2004). However, these rates of return could mirror the US VCs' early success in 
posting extraordinary returns in the 1980s, returns of 40% to 80% and some as 
high as 318% (Huntsman & Hoban, 1980). Furthermore, a complete and sound 
business plan is considered as a critical requirement in the investment decision. 
Entrepreneurs need to develop a plan for describing the elements of a proposed 
investment project that would enable VCs to clearly see the plan of action and the 
necessary expertize and funding needed to implement it. Such a plan could be 
used to align the goals of VCs and entrepreneurs and thus could mitigate agency 
problem concerns. Moreover, VCs place emphasis on a business plan with the 
belief that the quality of a well conceived and organized business plan indicates 
the quality of the entrepreneur and its management team; as a result, VCs are apt 
to favour such potential investments over those with little planning (Edgar, 
1995). Even in the case of Pakistan, having an incomplete plan is among the key 
reasons for the rejection of applications for venture funding. Among the least 
concerned criteria are the expectation to make subsequent investment and 
necessary participation in the initial round of investment. In environment-related 
factors, Pakistani VCs consider government regulations more important than 
government tax benefits, implying that government regulations are relatively 
more burdensome and unstable in Pakistan.  
 
Management Team Composition 
 
The studies relating to evaluation criteria mostly conclude that the management 
team is the dominant criterion in the investment evaluation process of VCs 
(Zopounidis, 1994). VCs invest in management rather than in products. As noted 
by Arthur Rock (1987), principal of Arthur Rock & Co., a San Francisco-based 
venture capital company that has funded such companies as Fairchild 
Semiconductor, Scientific Data Systems, Teledyne, Intel, and Apple Computer, 
"The problem with those companies (and with the ventures I choose not to take 
part in) is rarely one of strategy. Good ideas and good products are a dime a 
dozen. Good execution and good management—in a word, good people—are 
rare."2 
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Keith (1991) shows a similar concern that more than ever, the name of the game 
is management. If you find a company with the right horses, you back it to the 
hilt. Otherwise, you think twice. The finding of this study supports this view, as 
80% of Pakistani VCs will not fund a venture that lacks a competent, balanced 
management team [Table 2(c)]. However, 20% of Pakistani VCs may still 
discount the requirement of balanced management team if the venture has more 
attractions in other factors. 
 
Table 2(a) 
Top 10 most important evaluation criteria for Pakistan VCs 
 
No. Evaluation criteria Mean[SD] 
1 Integrity 4.0[0] 
2 Competitive advantage 4.0[0] 
3 Venture can be easily made liquid (by going public or acquisition, etc.) 3.8[.45] 
4 Equity stake in the venture 3.8[.45] 
5 Capable of sustained intense effort 3.6[.55] 
6 Managerial capabilities 3.6[.55] 
7 Sound business plan 3.6[.55] 
8 Commitment and enthusiasm 3.4[.55] 
9 Thorough familiarity with target market 3.4[.55] 
10 Demonstrated market acceptance of product 3.4[.89] 
 
Table 2(b) 
Least important evaluation criteria for Pakistan VCs 
 
No. Evaluation criteria Mean[SD] 
1 High-tech product 1.2[.45] 
2 We will not be expected to make subsequent investment 1.4[.55] 
3 We will not participate in later rounds of investment (requires 
our participation in initial round) 1.8[.84] 
4 Government tax benefits 1.8[.84] 
5 Educational background and careers 2.2[.45] 
 
Table 2(c) 
Criteria relating to management team composition  
 
 Criteria % response 
A One person relevant experience essential 0 
B Team with similar experience essential 0 
C Balanced team essential 80 
D None is essential 20 
 
Similarities and Differences between Pakistan and US VCs 
 
There seem to be many similarities in the overall ratings of the evaluation criteria 
of Pakistan and US VCs. For the criterion capable of sustained intense effort, the 
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respondents from both countries have assigned a perfectly similar mean weight 
age of 3.6 on a four-point scale. The second significant similarity appears in 
criterion venture, which stimulates an existing market. This similarity shows the 
common concern of VCs for whether an entrepreneur's business can stimulate the 
existing market by better meeting consumer needs. Second, Andrew et al. (2007) 
argue that VCs, in their efforts to reduce the risk of making faulty investment 
decisions in emerging economies, prefer to follow a proven recipe by depending 
on the same evaluation criteria used by US venture capitalists in the evaluation of 
new investment proposals. However, differences mainly arise with regard to the 
familiarity with and the referral of the entrepreneur. For the criteria of familiarity 
with the entrepreneur's reputation and referral by trustworthy source, Pakistani 
VCs have given 1.37 and .77 more value in mean weight age, respectively, than 
did US VCs, indicating a significant difference. The requirement of a high-tech 
product is nearly an irrelevant factor for Pakistani VCs, but it is of some 
importance to US sources, as indicated in their mean scores. This result may 
show the lack of high-technology business opportunities in Pakistan. Finally, the 
ability to deliver an oral presentation for the venture-funding proposal is more 
important to US VCs (Russell, 1994) than to their counterparts in Pakistan as 
well as to those in India. These differences, especially in the criteria relating to 
the familiarity and referral issues of the entrepreneur, suggest that Pakistani VCs 
seem to follow the relationship-based approach rather than the market-based 
approach in making investment decisions. In investment decisions, the 
relationship-based strategy focuses on VCs personal and social ties and the 
venture capital firms' inter-organizational relationships since it has the potential 
to reduce opportunistic behaviour and agency problems in the relationship 
between a venture capital firm and an entrepreneur. On the other hand, the 
market-based strategy concentrates on competitive resources, which are 
independent of the firm's networks, relationships and connections (Barney, 1991). 
Past research suggests that emerging economies have generally underdeveloped 
formal institutions, such as the rule of law, accounting standards, judiciary, 
administrative and regulatory institutions, which are in transition to becoming 
more stable and developed institutions (Peng, 2003). During this transition 
period, there lies greater institutional uncertainty. Therefore, in such an 
environment, specifically for venture capitalists, to make a funding decision, the 
relationship-based strategy may first become most relevant. Over time, once the 
key formal institutions have reached a state of stability, where they can reduce 
the uncertainties of VCs, especially in terms of laws, regulations and 
enforcements, then a market-based strategy is likely to be more relevant in VC 
investment decisions. The adaptation of a relationship-based strategy in decision 
making is one of the ways to fill the institutional voids caused by weak 
institutional support in the emerging economies. For example, this strategy helps 
to settle disputes or enforce contracts in the absence of efficient formal 
institutions charged to promptly and cost-effectively resolve such cases. More 
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recently, Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) suggest that VCs in emerging markets will 
migrate from a relationship-based transaction structure to a market-based 
structure over time. However, one can still not rule out the importance of a 
relationship-based strategy in VCs' funding decisions, as the focus on relations is 
also present to some degree in more developed economies such as the US (Shane 
& Cable, 2002). 
 
Table 3(a) 
Most similar criteria in mean weight age given by VCs in Pakistan and US 
 
Evaluation criteria Difference in means 
Capable of sustained intense effort 0.00 
Venture stimulates an existing market –0.03 
We will not be expected to make a subsequent investment +0.06 
Personality is compatible with mine +0.11 
Ability to evaluate and react to risk well –0.14 
 
Table 3(b) 
Most dissimilar criteria in mean weight age given by VCs in Pakistan and US 
 
Evaluation criteria Difference in means 
Familiarity with entrepreneur's reputation +1.37 
Demonstrated market acceptance of product +0.95 
High-tech product –0.83 
Venture creates a new market +0.78 
Referred by trustworthy source +0.77 
 
Notes: In Tables 3A and 3B the difference in + (–) shows Pakistani VCs are more 
(less) demanding than US VCs. 
 
Similarities and Differences between Pakistan and Indian VCs  
 
Overall, Pakistani VCs have given more weight to nearly all criteria than did 
Indian VCs. The most important similarity in the approaches of the VCs of both 
countries is that the entrepreneur should possess the ability to evaluate risk well. 
Generally, businesses in emerging economies are more exposed to the risk of 
failure, owing mainly to market- and business-related risks. The venture capital-
funded firms are particularly known to be riskier ventures. Therefore, it seems 
that VCs operating in emerging economies perceive that entrepreneurs who are 
the most adept at managing risk will succeed and that others will fail. 
Surprisingly, the major differences between Pakistani and Indian VCs appear 
with regard to the entrepreneur's characteristics in terms of familiarity and 
referral. Pakistani respondents place more emphasis on these two factors than do 
their Indian counterparts, suggesting that Pakistan is more relationship-based than 
India. This may be explained by the fact that since 2000, India's economic growth 
and the openness of its institutions to the international markets have been more 
rapid than those of Pakistan, which drives India relatively closer to the inflection 
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point of a market-based economy than Pakistan's position. As institutions become 
more stable in the emerging economies, they disseminate information about 
market participants (i.e., entrepreneurs) in a relatively efficient manner. 
Consequently, VCs give relatively less weight to the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur related to familiarity and referral. There is also a significant 
difference in the demonstrated market acceptance of a product criterion, where 
Pakistani sources are more demanding than Indian and US sources. This 
difference may be because Pakistan's domestic market is much smaller in size 
than the Indian and US markets. In this regard, the market's acceptance of a 
product seems to be a critical element in the success of ventures in a smaller-
sized domestic market before the venture finds its way in international markets. 
 
Table 4(a) 
Most similar criteria in mean weight age given by VCs in 
Pakistan and India 
 
Evaluation criteria Difference in means 
Ability to evaluate and react to risk well –0.02 
Thorough familiarity with target market +0.18 
Personality compatible with mine +0.20 
Integrity +0.22 
 
Table 4(b) 
Most dissimilar criteria in mean weight age given by VCs in Pakistan and India 
 
Evaluation criteria Difference in means 
Familiarity with entrepreneur's reputation +1.42 
Demonstrated market acceptance of product +1.18 
Referred by a trustworthy source +1.13 
Expected return equal to at least 10 times our investment within  
5–10 years 
+1.13 
Notes: In Tables 4A and 4B the difference in + (–) shows Pakistani VCs are more (less) demanding than 
Indian VCs. 
 
 
AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE 
 
Venture capital is basically the product of the US; the concept was then imported 
to Europe and Asia. Researchers suggest that unlike production technologies, the 
techniques of organisation (generally referred as transaction technologies) are 
often strongly complementary to a country's culture and stock of institutions 
(Thrainn, 1994) and are therefore difficult to import. Moreover, Asian cultures 
are considered to be collectivist, while Western cultures are more individualistic 
(Liu, 2007). In collectivist societies such as that of Asia, differences are solved 
and consensus is reached through relationships due to weak institutional support. 
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On the other hand, Western culture stresses the rights of the individual and the 
rule of law to work out any differences through strong institutional support. 
Therefore, given these broader institutional differences. it is assumed that the 
operational mode of a venture capital market would be different in Asian 
economies than in Western economies, especially the US. Past studies have 
mostly used institutional theory to explain the difference in the operations of the 
VCM in different parts of the world (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003) and have 
acknowledged the influence of institutional and cultural diversity on the 
performance of venture capital around the globe. In this section, in order to 
understand this further, I take on the agency perspective to probe my survey 
results regarding the VCM in Pakistan. The agency theory has a wider 
applications and has been used by research scholars in Economics (Spence & 
Zeckhauser, 1971), Accounting (Demski & Feltham, 1978), Finance (Fama, 
1980), Political Science (Mitnick, 1986), Marketing (Basu, Srinivasan & Staelin, 
1985), Organizational Behaviour (Kosnik, 1987), Sociology 3(Eccles, 1985) and 
most importantly explaining the venture capitalist-entrepreneur (VC-E) 
relationships in the entrepreneurial literature (Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza & Gupta, 
1994). According to agency theory, an agency problem can arise between the 
entrepreneur (agent) and the VC (principal) because of incongruent goals and 
potentially different risk preferences (Bruton, Freid & Hisrich, 1997). In essence, 
this theory assumes a principal-agent problem based on self-interested managerial 
rationality. This self-interested behaviour breeds asymmetric information, which 
in turn creates agency problems. Moral hazard and adverse selection comprise 
two forms in which agency problems takes shape (Masako & Neal, 1986). 
Moreover, moral hazard and adverse selection problems have a central role in 
institutional theory (Thrainn, 1994) and thus may have an explanatory power for 
the VCM. The problem of adverse selection arises from information asymmetry 
where the agent has more information than the principal. When adverse selection 
exists, agency theorists predict that the entrepreneur (agent) will act in his/her 
own self-interest at the expense of VCs (principal) (Paul & Adrian, 1993). Moral 
hazard is post-contractual opportunism that arises when an entrepreneur's action 
is unobservable and has a different value for the entrepreneur compared to that 
for the VC (Masako & Neal, 1986). VCs use selective screening and evaluation 
criteria to evaluate potential investment proposals to mitigate adverse selection. 
The researchers have found some potential mechanisms that VCs can use to deal 
with agency problems such as stage financing (Wang & Zhou, 2002), 
specialization and deal syndication with other reputable VCs (Edgar, 1995). 
However, Ian and Peter (1994) have comprehensively recommended four sources 
that can reduce the agency problem in relationship-based investing. Below, I 
discuss the results of my survey in light of these four sources. 
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1. Collecting Better Information about Managerial Ability and Value-
Enhancing Changes 
 
The heavy reliance on the relationship-approach strategy in investment decisions 
gives an advantage to Pakistani VCs in extracting information about 
entrepreneurs' managerial and other business skills, as the relation-focused 
strategy helps VCs to know not only the entrepreneur himself but also his/her 
family members, friends and former associates. Consequently, the relationship 
based on social trust develops between the VC and the entrepreneur. Although 
obtaining information from these sources and entering into a relationship with 
them is quite costly, it could be justified as long as the resultant reduction in 
potential agency problem is substantial (Ian & Peter, 1994). Moreover, other 
evidence also exists that working out such a relationship involves explicit 
research costs in an effort to lower future agency costs and current information 
asymmetry (Edgar, 1995). 
 
2. Monitoring Managerial Efforts and Implementing Incentive Schemes and 
Implicit Contracts 
 
VCs decide to make an investment once their goals are aligned with the investee, 
thereby significantly mitigating the agency problem in an ex ante evaluation 
process. However, it is highly likely that in an ex-post period, cracks may appear 
in goal alignment, which may cause moral hazard problem. For example, an 
entrepreneur may indulge in the activities that could bring him/her personal 
benefits, which may be value-destroying rather than value-enhancing to a 
venture, for example, using venture capital funds to purchase excessive 
perquisites (Jonathan & Lowell, 2003). Also, if there are private benefits from 
continuing a project, an entrepreneur may keep the project going even if it has 
negative expected profits (Wang & Zhou, 2002).  Therefore, the agency theory 
prescribes that VCs offer incentives and utilize monitoring to align the goals of 
the VC and those of the entrepreneur in order to protect against or mitigate a 
potential agency problem (Bohren, 1998). One such incentive could be a 
compenzation package structured to increase in value if an entrepreneur meets 
certain milestones and partial ownership schemes (Balkin, Markman & Gomez-
Mejia, 2000; Bohren, 1998). According to a Pakistani VCs manager, his firm 
offers equity ownership for the core management team in portfolio firms as an 
incentive package. This incentive could increase the likelihood of goal alignment 
between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur's management team, even in 
an expost situation. Venture capital is worth more than money because it 
provides monitoring and counselling services to its investee. This monitoring and 
consulting function of VCs helps an investee firm to increase return potential, 
lower risk and reduce concerns over agency costs (Edgar, 1995).  
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3. Introducing Improvements through Informal Negotiations or Takeovers 
 
Under the relationship-based strategy, VCs arguably have an edge over 
entrepreneurs in informal negotiations. This may be because VCs are well 
acquainted with entrepreneurs' backgrounds and the networks they belong to due 
to an efficient gathering of information. Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) argue that 
"a founder-entrepreneur may not take advice from the VC but he or she may be 
willing to do so from peers or individuals seen as his or her senior. Therefore, 
VCs may be able to use their relationships with the network to subtlety push the 
investee firm in the desired direction". Introducing improvements and putting the 
investee firm on the right path by exerting pressure on the relationship is a very 
familiar concept in Asia. For example, in China, this is referred to as Guanxi. 
This is defined as a special relationship due to the existence of particularistic ties 
(Tsui, Farh & Xin, 2000). Chinese VCs rely heavily on Guanxi in investment 
criteria to reduce uncertainties in investment decisions (Batjargal & Liu, 2004; 
Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003). This also helps VCs to provide significant value to 
the investee firm (Bruton, & Ahlstrom, 2003) which otherwise could have been 
difficult. Similarly, in Russia, this relationship-based concept is referred to as 
Svyazi 4 (meaning relationships). There is evidence that relationships in the 
context of Svyazi reduce uncertainties in financial transactions (Guseva & Rona, 
2001). This concept of relying on Guanxi or Svyazi relationships also pervades 
the business cultures of Japan, Korea and India (José & Gómez, 1998). 
 
4. Insulating Good Mangers from Inefficient Takeover Pressures 
 
This is most important when a takeover would disrupt long-term incentives or 
when the stock market is highly volatile and is likely to misprice value (Ian & 
Peter, 1994). The stock market in Pakistan lags behind the level of development 
that many other regional national markets (such as those of India, China and 
Singapore) have attained and therefore increases the chances of the investee 
firm's being mispriced in the domestic stock market. Moreover, Pakistan's stock 
market has played a very limited role in providing an exit mechanism via Initial 
Public Offerings (IPO) or Over-the-Counter (OTC) to the venture capital 
investment. Furthermore, the entrepreneur of a venture capital-backed firm may 
cave in to inefficient trade sales pressure if he or she is not able to obtain 
additional funding from VCs or from other conventional sources. However, in the 
case of Pakistani VCs seem to insulate the entrepreneur against inefficient 
takeover pressure, since VCs consider aiding in additional financing and in public 
offerings as the 4th and 6th most important activities, respectively, among the 
value-added services being provided to an investee firm (Khoso, 2007). 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The presence of an active venture capital industry in emerging economies is 
necessary for promoting economic, technological and entrepreneurial growth. 
This paper examines how VCs make investment decisions in Pakistan and then 
compares investment evaluation criteria used by Pakistani VCs to that of their 
counterparts in the US and India. It is found that the criteria related to the 
entrepreneur and management team (EMT) are considered predominant and 
decisive in making investment decisions, suggesting that Pakistani VCs prefer 
quality 1 (EMT) with a quality-2 business idea to having quality 2 (EMT) with a 
quality-1 business idea [Tables 2(a), 2(c)]. Among the factors suggested by Fried 
and Hisrich (1994), the entrepreneur's integrity and venture's competitive 
advantage are unanimously perceived by Pakistani VCs as 'must-have' factors in 
the investment decision. Pakistani VCs focus on (EMT), especially on the 
familiarity and referral side of the entrepreneur, has a greater potential to align 
the interests of VCs with entrepreneurs, suggesting Pakistan VCs concern for 
reducing agency problems in the pre-funding period. However, this difference 
arises mainly in activities that compensate for the lack of key formal institutions, 
such as having an established accounting system and providing government 
relations. Moreover, in this paper, I draw on agency theory to further view my 
survey results regarding Pakistan's VCM. The findings are in line with agency 
theory's proposal that the relationship-based approach may be better suited to 
mitigate the agency problem, particularly adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, by implementing the four prescriptions outlined by Ian and Peter 
(1994). Formal institutions such as rule of law, judiciary, administrative and 
regulatory institutions are in a transition period in emerging economies; as a 
result, these institutions are relatively less stable in a period of transition. In such 
an environment, VCs adopt some different approaches in evaluating an 
investment proposal. For example, VCs working in emerging economies (as in 
the case of Pakistan) rely heavily on a relationship-based approach in the 
investment evaluation process and may gradually move to a market-based 
approach once the economy attains stability in its formal institutions. A 
relationship-based approach focusing on social networks can help substitute for 
the formal institutions such as law, regulation and enforcement (Ahlstrom & 
Bruton, 2006) in facilitating the process of financial and non-financial 
transactions in the operation of a VCM. Lending based on a relationship-based 
approach appears to be an efficient information collection mechanism (Berger & 
Udell, 1998) and therefore could have a potential to greatly reduce information 
asymmetry in an ex-ante and ex-post investment relationship between VCs and 
an entrepreneur. 
 
However, the effects of the relationship-based approach in lending differ across 
emerging nations, presumably due to differences in their macroeconomic 
97 
Khoso Imamuddin 
environments in terms of the information infrastructure, business conditions, the 
fragility of the financial system and the regulatory regime (Berger & Udell, 
1998). My findings support this notion, as Pakistan and Indian venture capitalists 
that are working in emerging economies differ in their reliance on the 
relationship-based approach in making investment decisions. The results in 
[Table 4(b)] show that Pakistani VCs place more weight on the relational and 
referral characteristics of an entrepreneur than their Indian counterparts, 
suggesting that Pakistan is more relationship-based than India. Emerging 
economies are characterized by rapid economic growth. The pace at which 
emerging economies grow determines in part their closeness toward a market-
based economy. Since the start of the new millennium India's economic growth 
and the openness of its institutions to the international market have been faster 
than that of Pakistan, making Indian economic institutions relatively more 
efficient and more market-based. Consequently, Indian institutions are in a 
relatively better position to channel information about market participants (i.e., 
entrepreneurs) in a relatively efficient way, which makes Indian VCs lessen their 
reliance on the relational and referral factors of an entrepreneur.  
 
The findings of this study have several implications. First, it provides a list of the 
investment evaluation criteria used by Pakistan's VCs community, which may 
help entrepreneurs seeking venture capital financing in Pakistan to better prepare 
their business proposals. Second, the understanding that Pakistan VCs rely 
heavily on a relationship-based approach in their investment decision policies and 
that VCs reliance on relationship-based strategy changes with respect to 
institutional context might help policy makers to improve the overall 
performance of Pakistan's VCM.  
 
Finally, this is the first study of its nature in Pakistan and, based on a small 
sample size, it provides a preliminary examination of the differences in VCs' 
decision policies regarding investment evaluation criteria. Further research is 
clearly needed to undertake an in-depth comparative analysis of other important 
aspects of VC decision making such as deal origination, due diligence and deal 
structuring (across emerging economies with a larger sample) to further 
understand how the relationship-based strategy works in the venture capital 
markets of emerging economies with different institutional contexts. 
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NOTES  
 
1. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), three firms are 
currently licensed venture capital companies in Pakistan. 
2. This quote is taken from the book of Keith Schilit W. (1991). Dream Makers and Deal 
Breakers. Prentice-Hall, pp. 100–101. 
3. These references are taken from the article: Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 1989. Agency theory: An 
assessment and review. The Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57. 
4. Svyazi is sometimes referred as Blat in Russian literature. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Evaluation Criteria Used by Venture Capitalists: A Comparative Picture 
              
  Pakistan US* INDIA** 
 Evaluation Criteria  Mean[SD] Mean[SD] Mean 
 I. Entrepreneur's Personality    
1 Integrity 4.0[0] n/a 3.78 
2 Capable of sustained intense effort 3.6[.55] 3.60[.57] 3.11 
3 Ability to evaluate and react to risk well 3.2[.45] 3.34[.73] 3.22 
4 Personality compatible with mine 2.2[.84] 2.09[.81] 2.00 
5 Articulate in discussing venture 2.6[.55] 3.11[.71] 2.22 
6 Attends to detail 3.0[.71] 2.82[.69] 2.78 
7 Technical skills vis-à-vis venture 2.6[.55] n/a n/a 
8 Managerial capabilities 3.6[.55] n/a n/a 
9 Insight and forecast ability 3.2[.45] n/a n/a 
10 Commitment and enthusiasm 3.4[.55] n/a n/a 
11 Equity stake in the venture 3.6[.89] n/a n/a 
 II. Entrepreneur's Experience    
12 Demonstrated leadership ability in past 3.2[1.1] 3.41[.67] 2.78 
13 Track record relevant to venture 3.0[.71] 3.24[.69] 2.67 
14 Thorough familiarity with target market 3.4[.55] 3.58[.57] 3.22 
15 Familiarity with entrepreneur's reputation 3.2[.45] 1.83[.71] 1.78 
16 Referred by trustworthy source 2.8[.45] 2.03[.62] 1.67 
17 Educational background and careers 2.2[.45] n/a n/a 
 III. Product/ Service Characteristics    
18 Uniqueness of product 2.2[.45] n/a 3.11 
19 Demonstrated market acceptance of product 3.4[.89] 2.45[.74] 2.22 
20 Proprietary or otherwise protected product 2.8[.84] 3.11[.71] 2.22 
21 Product developed to the point of a functioning 
prototype 2.8[.50] 2.38[.90] 
3.11 
22 High-tech product 1.2[.45] 2.03[.96] 1.67 
23 Ease of technical manpower procurement 3.0[0] n/a n/a 
24 Raw material availability 3.2[.45] n/a n/a 
25 Competitive advantage 4.0[0] n/a n/a 
 IV. Market Characteristics    
26 Large market size 3.0[.71] n/a 2.00 
27 High market growth potential 3.2[.45] 3.34[.64] 3.33 
28 Little threat of competition during the first three 
years 2.6[.55] 2.33[.72] 
2.22 
29 Venture is in a market familiar to that of our 
venture capitalist firm 2.8[.84] 2.36[.78] 
 
1.78 
30 Venture creates a new market 2.6[1.1] 1.82[.83] 2.00 
31 Venture stimulates an existing market 2.4[.89] 2.43[.76] 1.78 
32 Access to distribution channel 2.8[.45] n/a n/a 
 V. Financial Characteristics    
33 Expected return equal to at least 10 times our 
investment within 5–10 years 
2.8[.84] 3.42[.79] 1.67 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
  Pakistan US* INDIA** 
34 Expected return equal to at least 10 times our 
investment within at least 5 years 
2.2[.45] 2.34[.81] 1.78 
35 Venture can be easily made liquid (by going public or 
acquisition, etc.) 3.8[.45] 3.17[.89] 
 
3.33 
36 Capacity to obtain complementary financing 2.8[.84] n/a n/a 
37 We will not be expected to make subsequent 
investment 1.4[.55] 1.34[.52] 
1.00 
38 We will not participate in later rounds of investment 
(requires our participation in initial round) 1.8[.84] 1.20[.45] 
 
1.00 
39 Sound business plan 3.6[.55] n/a n/a 
 VI. Environment Conditions    
40 Government tax benefits 1.8[.84] n/a n/a 
41 Government regulations 2.8[.45] n/a n/a 
Note: Four-point scale used: 1 = irrelevant,   2 = desirable, 3 = important, 4 = essential 
  *Study of MacMillan et al. (1985) 
 **Study of Pandey I.M. (1995) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Evaluation Activities Carried Out by Venture Capitalists: A Comparative Picture 
 
How often (%) Activity US India Pakistan 
Interview all members of management team 100 96 92 
Tour facilities 100 82 72 
Contact entrepreneur's former business associates 96 97 78 
Contact existing outside investors 96 75 56 
Contact current customers 93 68 78 
Contact potential customers 90 56 68 
Investigate market value of comparable companies 86 89 67 
Have informal discussions with experts about the product 84 82 96 
Conduct in-depth review of pro forma financials prepared by 
company 
84 93 80 
Contact competitors 71 66 60 
Contact banker 62 94 52 
Solicit the opinion of mangers of some of your other portfolio 
companies 
56 92 54 
Contact suppliers 53 86 64 
Solicit the opinion of other venture capital firms 52 55 38 
Contact accountant 47 59 64 
Contact attorney 44 39 66 
Conduct in-depth library research 40 52 50 
Secure formal technical study of product 36 79 54 
Secure formal market research study 31 91 76 
 
 
